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INTERNATIONAL LAW: THROUGH NATIONAL OR
INTERNATIONAL COURTS?
THOMAS M. FRANCKt
NTERNATIONAL LAW is, of course, what international courts
do. Third-party law in the international community is made by
judges of international tribunals: the International Court of Justice,
the regional courts of Europe,' as well as the various tribunals func-
tionally designed to resolve specific problems2 or problems arising out
of anticipated circumstances.2
Third-party law in the international community is, however, also
made by national courts. Indeed, American judges, in common with
those of other countries, are actually the principal progenitors of
third-party international law. They are profoundly involved in the
process of international law-making, for international law is part of
t Professor of Law, New York University Law School; B.A., 1952, LL.B.,
1953, University of British Columbia; LL.M., 1954, S.J.D., 1959, Harvard Law
School.
1. There are two of these: The Court of Justice of the European Communities,
which incorporates the former Court of the Coal and Steel Community (Convention
Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, 298
U.N.T.S. 14, 1958. See also, Treaty Institution the European Coal and Steel
Community, 261 U.N.T.S. 142, 1951.) and the Human Rights Court (Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221,
1950). For a discussion of the Court of Justice's jurisprudence see: Buergenthal,
Appeals for Annulment by Enterprises in the European Coal and Steel Community,
10 AM. J. COMP. L. 227.
2. There have been numerous such tribunals, beginning, in modern times, with
the Jay Treaty between Britain and the United States, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. 105, 1794,
which set the pattern for mixed claims commissions composed of nationals of the
two disputing 12arties and a third state. See: STUYT, SURVEY ol INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS 1794-1938 (1939). For a criticism of the operation of these com-
missions in the field of claims see: LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS (1962).
3. Many treaties contain provision for settling disputes arising out of ambiguities
in their text. Those between non-Communist states frequently provide for the
referral of such disputes to the International Court. Treaties with the Soviet Union
involve special problems, an example of which is the State Treaty for the Re-
establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria, 217 U.N.T.S. 225, 1955,
(139)
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the law of all civilized states, and, reciprocally, the jurisprudence of
national courts is a major source of international law.4
This role of the national courts in the making of world law has
been given scant credit by the writers who have been attracted by the
more recent and more dramatic growth of international courts.5 Yet
the International Court itself pays deference to the "general principles
of law recognized by civilized states";6 and what better source is
there of such general principles than the jurisprudence of national
judiciaries ?7
The role of the national judge in processing the law of nations
was recognized by the United States courts early in American judicial
history. Faced with the confiscation of a French-owned slave-ship by
a United States naval unit off the coast of Africa, Mr. Justice Story in
1822 - at a time when slavery was still lawful in the United States
- wrote of the slave-traffic: "Now there is scarcely a single maritime
nation of Europe, that has not in most significant terms, in the most
deliberate and solemn conferences, acts, or treaties, acknowledged the
injustice and inhumanity of this trade; and pledged itself to promote
its abolition."' Therefore, "I am bound to consider the trade an offence
against the universal law of society."9 Three years later, the United
States Supreme Court rejected this position, but only after satisfying
itself that the international law of 1825 did not sustain the prematurely
enlightened view of it taken by Mr. Justice Story.' ° Both decisions
turned on international law, for, in the words of Chancellor Kent,
which contains three arbitration clauses, arts. 10, 30 and 35. The first makes
provision for an Arbitration Commission consisting of one representative of the
Soviet Union, one representative of Austria, and one, "a national of a third country,
selected by mutual agreement between the two Governments," to decide disputes
arising out of the disposition of German assets in Austria. Under Article 35, the
interpretation of any article of the treaty which is not subject to other special proce-
dures is referred to a Commission composed of one representative of each party to the
dispute "and a third member selected by mutual agreement of the two parties from
nationals of a third country. Should the two parties fail to agree within a period
of one month upon the appointment of the third member, the Secretary General of
the United Nations may be requested by either party to make the appointment"
(emphasis added). The Commission is authgrized to take its decision by majority
vote: art. 35(2).
4. For an example of how the behavior of national courts constitutes evidence
of international law, see the decision of the World Court in the Minquiers and
Ecrehos Case, I.C.J. Rep. 47, 62, 67-68 (1953).
5. See, however, LAUTMRPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1927).
6. Statute of the I.C.J., art. 38. For instances of the application of art. 38, see
Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized
Nations., 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 734, 736 n.10 (1957).
7. See: Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized
Nations, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 734 (1957).
8. United States v. The Schooner La Jeune Eugenie, 26 Fed. Cas. 833, 846
(1822).
9. Id. at 847.
10. The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 30, 23 U.S. 66 (1825).
[VOL. 8: p. 139
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"When the United States ceased to be a part of the British Empire,
and assumed the character of an independent nation, they became sub-
ject to that system of rules which reason, morality and custom had
established among the civilized nations of Europe, as their public
law. . . .The faithful observance of this law is essential to national
character. . .."11
In the years since "national character" descended upon these
United States, some 164 decisions of the federal Supreme Court have
called forth the judges' vision of international law. 12 Many times that
number of international law cases were resolved at lower judicial levels.
The American experience is by no means unusual in this respect.
The United States Constitution, of course, specifically assimilates
treaties to the supreme law of the land ;13 but more recently-conceived
constitutions have gone even further. West Germany specifies that
"general rules of international law shall take precedence over the laws
and create rights and duties directly for the inhabitants of the federal
territory."'1 4 The Italian constitution provides that "The Italian juri-
dicial system conforms to the generally recognized principles of inter-
national law."' 5 Some of the newest fundamental laws of former
colonial states have gratefully (if selectively) incorporated significant
portions of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.'1 Ac-
cordingly, national courts will, in the future, continue to be frequently
occupied with international law-making.1"
Why, then, must we have international courts at all? National
courts are generally cheaper and faster in serving the client.'" More-
11. KENT, COMMENTARIES 1-2 (12th ed. 1873).
12. This count extends to the end of 1961.
13. Art. II, Sec. 2, cl. 2.
14. Constitution of the German Federal Republic, art. 25, 2 PEASLU, CON-
STITUTIONS OF NATIONS 30, 34.
15. Constitution of Italy, art. 10, PtASL99, id. p. 482 at 483.
16. The Constitution of Lybia, 1951, ch. 2 ("Rights of the People") is an ex-
ample in that it draws heavily on the International Declaration of Human Rights
(U.N. Doc. A/810), PEASLEt, id. p. 599 at 600-602, while yet avoiding the reference
to rights of women. See also: the Special Statute for Trieste (1954), U.N. Docs.
S/3301, S/3305. For a discussion of the Universal Declaration as part of the
preamble to the Japanese Peace Treaty see: Schwelb, The Influence of the
Universal Declaration of Human Right on International and National Law, A.S.I.L.
PROCEEDINGs 217, 221-22 (1959). See also the discussion, therein, of the influence
of the Declaration on constitution-making in the French Cameroons, Togoland and
Eritrea.
17. Is, for example, the United Nations Charter part of the law of the United
States; and, if so, what impact does it have on domestic legislation? For a view
that it affects even the congressional war-making powers under the constitution,
see: Miele v. McGuire, 53 N.J. Super. 506, 612; 147 A. 2d 827, 830 (1959), "under
our present membership in the United Nations, a declaration of war by the Congress
is no longer necessary in order to commit our armed forces to combat."
18. It should be added, however, that the procedure of the International Court
is regarded by some practitioners as extraordinarily well suited to the difficult
realities of international pleading that involves counsel of many nations before
a bench of jurists trained in different systems of law. See: ROSENNE, THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 415 (1957).
WINTER 1962-63]
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over, they venture on the uncharted seas of international law in
streamlined vessels equipped with the latest administrative, political
and executory conveniences while the international courts are cast
adrift in the rather leaky tub of international organization. So long as
there is no recognizable international political community generating a
World "public policy," no international police force to execute judicial
decrees, and no international legislature to initiate universal legislative
reform - why not simply leave international law exclusively in the
tried and true hands of national courts ?19
The answer is, in part, that national courts are tried and true to a
particular national concept of international law. Just as federal law
cannot be exclusively the province of state courts, so international law
cannot be the sole prerogative of national courts.
Which "international" causes ought to be subject to international
jurisdiction? Here, again, international law can learn from the ex-
perience of national, and particularly from federal legal systems. "To
judge with accuracy the proper extent of the federal judiciary," said
Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 80,20 "it will be necessary
to consider in the first place what are its proper objects."
"It seems scarcely to admit of controversy that the judiciary au-
thority of the union ought to extend to these several descriptions of
causes, . . .To all those which arise out of the laws of the United
States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of
legislation; ... to all those which ... relate to the intercourse between
the United States and foreign nations, or that between the States
themselves . . . and lastly, to all those in which the state tribunals
cannot be supposed to be impartial or unbiased."
In words borrowed from Professor Paul Freund in the other
context, international courts are necessary to "umpire the international
system."21
This is not to say that national courts should play no role in the
international field. There are, however, three areas of litigation,
closely parallel to those conceived by Hamilton, in which the decisions
of national courts ought not to be final:
1. Where the issue directly affects the interest of two or more
states, their citizens or property, and these states are not in
agreement as to the applicable international legal doctrine.
2. Where the issue directly affects the interests of two or more
states, their citizens or property, and the national courts are
19. For a further discussion of this point see: LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION
OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ch. XI (1933).
20. "The Federalist" no. 80, in J. E. Cooke, ed., 534 (1961).
21. Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 561 (1954).
[VOL. 8: p. 139
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in law precluded from making an impartial determination by
the political arm of Government.
3. Where the issue directly affects the interests of two or more
states, their citizens or property, and the issue concerns the
interpretation of a treaty, convention or agreement between
those states.
The first area, that of conflicting international legal doctrine, is
illustrated by the problems of Francisco Mendoza-Martinez. Born of
Mexican parents in the United States, Mendoza-Martinez was a Mexi-
can citizen under Mexican law (which follows the principle of the
jus sanguinis) and an American citizen under the laws of the United
States (according to the jus soli doctrine). In 1942 Mendoza-
Martinez left the United States for Mexico in order to avoid the
draft. At the end of the war he returned, was arrested and sentenced
to prison for a year.22
Was the United States law regarding evasion of military service
applicable to a person who, under Mexican law, was a citizen of Mexico
and who, apparently, acted in a manner fully in accord with Mexican
law? Could the United States make it a crime for a Mexican citizen
to return to Mexico in preference to serving in the United States armed
forces ? Each sovereign state may, of course, legislate as it chooses in
matters of nationality and citizenship.23 This method of gaining juris-
diction over the individual is not, however, unlimited - it must not
conflict with the rights of other states in international law.24 It must
not, for example, disregard the requirement of international law that
there be a nexus, a real relationship between the state and the indi-
vidual on whom it seeks to confer its citizenship.25 Is the arrest and
imprisonment of Mendoza-Martinez an exercise of ordinary national
discipline by the United States over one of its own, or is it a gratuitous
attack on the right of Mexico to "ingather" someone who, under
Mexican law, is a Mexican citizen? In answer, the United States
asserts its refusal to recognize the concept of dual nationality26 - but,
22. Reported in the later proceedings for deprivation of citizensship: Mackey v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U.S. 384, 386 n.2 (1960).
23. Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees Case, 1923 P.C.I.J. Series B, No. 4.
24. Ibid.
25. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Gautemala), 1955 I.C.J. REP. 4. A
similar rule was approved by a United States court which held that German citizen-
ship could not, by act of annexation, be imposed on Austrian citizens who were not
in Austria at the time - because international law restricted the right of imposi-
tion to inhabitants over whom the annexing state had actual control. United States
ex rel. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, 137 F. 2d 898 (2d Cir. 1943).
26. Yet recognition is sometimes forced upon it. See, for example, Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), in which the United States Supreme Court, and
especially Brennan, J., distinguished between expatriation of United States citizens
who are dual nationals and those who, having but one nationality, are thereby rendered
"stateless."
WINTER 1962-63]
5
Franck: International Law: Through National or International Courts
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
while this may be conclusive for an American citizen and an American
court, ought it to be conclusive for the government and citizens of
Mexico?
A similar dilemma was faced by a Chilean court, which, however,
arrived at quite a different answer. Hector Garcia was born of
Spanish parents in Chile. Chilean law made him a Chilean; under
Spanish law he was also a Spaniard. When Garcia refused to serve in
the Chilean army he was given a thirty day sentence. This the Chilean
Court of Appeal reversed because it felt that the applicable Chilean
law must be read in accordance with the law of nations so as to grant
Garcia a choice between Chilean and Spanish nationality and juris-
diction.1
7
Which concept is correct? Only an international court has the
posture of impartiality necessary to lay the conflict of doctrines to rest.
The role of the international court in "umpiring" direct "diversity"
conflicts of this sort is illustrated by the case of the S.S. Lotus which
was decided in 1927 by the Permanent Court of International Justice.2"
The Lotus was a French mail steamer which, while on the high seas
en route to Constantinople, collided with the Turkish freighter Boz-
Kourt. The Boz-Kourt was cut in twain and sank immediately, taking
eight Turkish nationals with her. The Lotus, after doing what she
could for the Boz-Kourt, proceeded to Constantinople, where Turkish
authorities arrested the first officer, a French national named Demons.
After a trial, Demons was sentenced to eighty days in jail and a
fine of £22.
The Turkish prosecution had been brought under Article 6 of
the Turkish Penal Code which stated:
Any foreigner who . . . commits an offense abroad to the
prejudice of Turkey or of a Turkish subject, for which offense
Turkish law prescribes a penalty involving loss of freedom for a
minimum period of not less than one year, shall be punished in
accordance with the Turkish Penal Code provided that he is
arrested in Turkey.29
This statute incorporates the "passive personality" doctrine of
international law which many states, including France, vehemently
reject.
The French lawyers argued, according to international law
a state is not entitled, apart from express or implicit special
27. Chile, Court of Appeals of Santiago, 5 Revista de Derecho y Jurisprudencia,
pt. 2, sec. 2, p. 28. Abstracted in BISHOP, CASES AND MATERIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 318 (1st ed. 1953).
28. Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10.
29. Id. at 15.
[VOL. 8" p. 139
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agreements, to extend the criminal jurisdiction of its courts to
include a crime or offense committed by a foreigner abroad solely
in consequence of the fact that one of its nationals has been a
victim of the crime or offense.30
Here, then, were two concepts of the international law of juris-
diction engaged in a tug-of-war over Captain Demons. Neither French
nor Turkish courts could resolve the issue fairly, since each would
follow its own doctrine. Appropriately, the two countries agreed to
submit the question to the World Court, which decided in favour of
Turkey, finding that "the offense produced its effects on the Turkish
vessel and consequently in a place assimilated to Turkish territory."'"
International law, the majority ruled, does not preclude a state from
taking jurisdiction over a crime "if one of the constituent elements of
the offence, and more especially its effects, have taken place there ..."
even though the author of the offence happens at the time to be
somewhere else.32
Like the courts in this country, the World Court refused to
umpire a hypothetical play. Since Turkish jurisdiction could be sus-
tained on territorial grounds, there was no need to decide whether the
''passive personality" principle is valid international law.
Nevertheless, Turkey won. Indeed, it won a double victory, since
its right to try M. Demons was not only sustained by a court, but by
the World Court. Had the same decision been made by a Turkish
court, even one purporting to base its decision on international law,
both M. Demons and the French government would have suspected
that they had not been fairly served by the third-party process.
Such cases arise frequently. Recently, the president of a Pana-
manian corporation (La Belle Creole), with its principal place of busi-
ness in Haiti, was served with a subpoena by the Attorney General of
New York. 3 The server managed to catch the President while he
was staying at a New York hotel on a visit. He was directed to
produce certain books and documents necessary to determine the appli-
cability of a New York law which states:
Whenever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or
illegal acts .. . in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of
business, the attorney-general may apply .. .for an order enjoin-
ing the continuance of such business. ...
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id. at 23.
32. Ibid.
33. La Belle Creole International S.A. v. Attorney General of N.Y., 10 N.Y.
2d 192, 1.76 N.E. 2d 705 (1961).
WINTER 1962-63]
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What constitutes "carrying on ... of business" in New York so
as to give New York jurisdiction over the allegedly illegal activity of
a Panamanian corporation? Apparently, La Belle Creole was in the
business of placing orders for liquor on behalf of Americans travelling
abroad (who may, thereby, be entitled to a duty-free quota). A New
York corporation, Interamerica, did the advertising and soliciting for
Creole in New York, and supplied potential customers with "order
kits" for the duty-free liquor service. All orders were mailed by the
customer directly to a Creole office in Switzerland. The liquor was
then sent directly to the customer, payment being made either in
Switzerland or Puerto Rico. La Belle Creole had no tangible assets
and "transacted" no business within the borders of New York.
The New York Court of Appeal held that New York nevertheless
had jurisdiction to subpoena the president. Does it also have juris-
diction to subject him to suit?" More important, does New York
have jurisdiction to compel him to divulge information about his
Panamanian corporation which the laws of Panama require him not
to divulge ?5 These issues, surely, are as appropriate for international
adjudication or judicial review, and for the same reasons, as the
conflict in the Lotus case.
As these cases indicate, conflicts of legal doctrine between various
states most frequently arise in matters of jurisdiction or nationality.
They can, however, arise in any international law field where states
try to attain paramountcy by means of a sort of jurisprudential
"enclosure movement."
A recent case arising in New York focuses this problem. In
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino8 the court had to deal with the
international law doctrine called "act of state." The Cuban (Castro)
Government, having seized certain supplies of sugar belonging to an
American firm, sold them on credit to an American purchaser. This
purchaser, under New York law,87 was compelled to pay not the
Cuban Government, but, instead, a New York receiver. The Cuban
Government brought this action to recover the money paid to the
receiver.
34. Id. at 708-9.
35. This issue is not a part of the La Belle Creole case, but rather an analogy
from an issue broached three years earlier by Societe Internationale Pour Participa-
tion Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). Here, the
lower courts had ordered a Swiss corporation to produce records which were located
in Switzerland." Compliance with the order would have put the corporation in
violation of Swiss penal law. The conflict did not come to fruition, however, because
the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts insofar as they had dismissed the Swiss
Corporation's suit for return of property seized by the Alien Property Custodian
solely on the corporation's failure to comply with their order.
36. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
37. N.Y. C.P.A. s.977(b).
[VOL. 8: p. 139
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Judge Dimock of the U. S. District Court in New York re-
jected the Cuban claim that acts of a Cuban Government, operating
internally, were immune under the act of state doctrine to attack in
the courts of other countries. "The crucial question remains," Judge
Dimock said, ". .. whether this court can examine the validity of the
Cuban act (of seizing the sugar) under international law and refuse
recognition to the act if it is in violation of international law ...
Probably the basic reason for judicial refusal to examine the validity
of acts of foreign states is a wise recognition of and respect for the
sovereignity of each state within its own territory, the right of each
state to conduct its own internal affairs as it wishes." 38
So far so good.
"The basis for such recognition and respect vanishes, however,
when the act of a foreign state violates not what may be our provincial
notions of policy but rather the standards imposed by international
law."3'9 The court then went on to analyse the reasons for Cuba's
nationalization of the sugar and the rate of compensation offered the
former owners. Finding that the seizure was a reaction to United
States curtailment of the Cuban sugar quota, Judge Dimock said "The
taking was avowedly in retaliation for acts by the Government of the
United States, and was totally unconnected with the subsequent use of
the property being nationalized. This fact alone is sufficient to render
the taking violative of international law."4
No authority is cited for this proposition of international law.
Judge Dimock also found the Cuban nationalization violative of
international law because it discriminated against United States na-
tionals as against all others without providing a reasonable basis for
such classification and because the compensation provided (in Cuban
Government bonds with a term of not less than thirty years bearing
two per cent interest and subject to a resumption of sales to the
United States) was inadequate.
These interpretations by Judge Dimock of international law, aside
from their controversial content, raise certain procedural questions. If
international law, impartially determined, were to hold the Cuban
nationalizations valid, then the seizure of payments by the New York
receiver would be a wrongful act for which the United States would
be liable to Cuba. The United States, in other words, could only
emerge from this dispute as the innocent party if Cuba were "found
guilty." Such a determination of an international law issue affecting
38. 193 F. Supp. 375, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.
1962).
39. Id. at 381.
40. Id. at 384-85.
WINTER 1962-63]
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foreign rights should, therefore, not be left to a United States judge,
for to do so raises at once a suspicion of potential partiality which is
harmful to the interests of both the court and the law. There is every
likelihood that, on the compensation issue at least, Judge Dimock's
views are right. How much better it . . . is to have this confirmed,
as Turkey did in the Lotus case, by an impartial international court.4
Indeed, it was perhaps this fact which was recognized in the decision
of the United States Court of Appeals in the same case. Judge Water-
man pointed out that "It is commonplace in many parts of the world
for a country not to pay for what it takes. Since it is unnecessary for
this court in the present case to decide whether a government's failure
in, and of itself, to pay adequate compensation for the property it takes
is a breach of international responsibility, we decline at this time to
attempt a resolution of that difficult question. ' 4 1 a If international law
exists at all, it must be in response to the need for a set of neutral
principles which govern international relations. Where there is a dis-
pute as to the content of these principles it cannot be, and appear to be,
neutrally resolved by the courts of one of the parties.
The second closely related area of litigation which ought to be
subject to international adjudication is illustrated by the classic British
litigation between Messrs. Luther and Sagor,42 the facts of which are
not unlike those of the Sabbatino case.
The litigation took place in the Court of King's Bench in 1921.
The James Sagor Company had been manufacturing plywood in
Russia since 1898. After the revolution, the firm was seized by Soviet
authorities who continued to operate it and to sell its products. One
such sale was made to a British importer, A. M. Luther, who brought
the lumber to England. Sagor Company, on hearing that some of
"their" plywood had reached England, asked the British Court to
rule on the question of title.
The British courts, considering the "act of state" doctrine binding
on them, felt constrained to honour the laws of the Government of
Russia. But were the Soviets really the Government of Russia in 1921 ?
If so, the lumber belonged to the Luther Company. If not, it belonged
to Sagor, for the Soviets could not validly sell what was not theirs.
To help him out of this dilemma, the British judge turned to the
Foreign Office. "The proper source of information as to a foreign
power, its status and sovereignty," he said, "is the Sovereign of this
41. This does not exclude the possibility that the jurisdiction of the International
Court might better be invoked by way of quasi-appeal after the exhaustion of avail-
able local (national) judicial remedies.
41a. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 864 (2d Cir. 1962).
42. Luther v. Sagor (1921) 1 K.B. 456.
[VOL. 8: p. 139
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country through the Government ... I therefore propose to deal with
the case upon the information furnished by His Majesty's Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs."43
He did not treat the communication of the Foreign Office as expert
evidence, subject to rebuttal, but as conclusive.
Since, at the time, Britain had not yet recognized the Soviet
government of Russia, the British courts were obliged to disregard its
act of nationalization and the property in Mr. Luther's hands was
handed over to the Sagor Company. By the time the case was heard
on appeal some months later," however, the British government had
recognized the Soviet regime. The court, finding that this recognition
operated retroactively - that the Soviets really had been the govern-
ment all along - now declared the seizure valid and ordered Sagor to
return the plywood to Luther. The British courts must have felt
somewhat foolish playing "follow the leader" down the tortuous
streets and byways of national policy with the Foreign Office.
American courts are also subject to such executive intervention,
although they do at times manage to act independently even in matters
intimately related to questions of foreign policy. 5 However, the num-
ber of instances in which they do not, raises a real doubt about the
neutral quality of international law dispensed by the national courts
under such circumstances.
In the litigation between the Bank of China and the American
Wells Fargo Bank,46 for example, the court had to choose between
two rival sets of Chinese Bank directors - those appointed by the
Communist Government and those appointed by the Nationalist -
both of whom claimed the right to withdraw funds deposited with
Wells Fargo. In 1952, at the time the case was determined by the
Federal Court in California, all Chinese territory (which, by the State
Department's own submission in a later case, does not include For-
43. Id. at 473-4.
44. Luther v. Sagor (1921) 3 K.B. 532.
45. For recent examples of such judicial independence see Upright v. Mercury
Business Machine Co., 213 N.Y.S. 2d 417 (1961), the New York courts were asked
to enforce a contract between defendant Mercury and an East German corporation
from which Mercury had ordered typewriters but withheld payment. The suit was
brought by an assignee of the East German Claim. It was held that "it is insuffi-
cient for defendant merely to allege the non-recognition of the East German Govern-
ment. The lack of jural status for such government or its creature corporation is
not determinative of whether transactions with it will be denied enforcement, in
American courts, so long as the government is not the suitor" (Id. at p. 421). Indeed,
even the East German corporation might be permitted to sue (Id. at p. 421 n).
See also Amtorg Trading Corp. v. U.S., 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934). Another
recent example of judicial independence is Stephen v. Zivnostenska Bank, 213 N.Y.S.
2d 396 (1961).
46. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co., 104 F. Supp.59 (N.D. Cal. 1952). See also earlier litigation in same case: 92 F. Supp. 920 (N.D.
Cal. 1950).
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mosa47) had been occupied by the Communists including, of course,
the headquarters of the bank. Nevertheless, the court ordered the funds
paid out to the Nationalists. "In this situation," the judge said, "the
Court should justly accept ...that government which our executive
deems best able to further the mutual interests of China and the
United States. 48
"Justice," it is submitted, had nothing to do with it. The decision
totally lacks that basis of "neutral" principle which respectable inter-
national law must have if it is not just to be political action by another
name. No doubt a functionally valid argument can be made out for
withholding funds from a government engaged in hostilities against
this country, perhaps by appointing a custodian for such property.
That, however, is the proper prerogative of the legislative and execu-
tive branch. It is neither "just" nor "impartial" to allow political
policy to dictate the courts' legal determination of aliens' claims -
and yet frequently it appears to do so, and not by any means in this
country alone.49
When the courts feel themselves obliged to defer to the executive,
they no longer "truly and impartially minister justice," nor do they
minister international law properly so-called. Suppose the application
of impartial principles by a neutral court were to reveal that the Chinese
Communists were, in fact, the Government of China. Changing this
key fact would, as in Luther v. Sagor, totally reverse the outcome of
the case. Does the determination of such a decisive fact-element by
the executive violate the separation of powers inherent in the constitu-
tion? Does it deprive the Chinese Communists of property without due
process? These are problems for the constitutional lawyer. But just
as the constitution of the United States prohibits a taking without due
process, so also does international law (as Judge Dimock pointed out
in the Sabbatino case). No nation can discharge its obligation under
this prohibition by an executive act withholding recognition from the
injured government. In determining the key issue: "who rules China ?"
- the community of nations cannot be expected to defer to executive
determinations, particularly if the determining party is also a party
to the dispute.
In a controversy of this sort, where the rights of aliens protected
by international law are likely to be adversely affected by the sub-
servience of courts to the dictates of national policy, the determinations
of the national courts should not be final, for they are not impartial.
47. Cheng Fu Sheng v. Rogers, 177 F. Supp. 281 (D.D.C. 1959).
48. 104 F. Supp. 59 at 66.
49. See, for example, Domke, The Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration 53 AM. J.
INT'L L. 787 (1959).
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The intervention of executive policy may not always injure the alien.
At times, as in the recent, surprising (and legally indefensible) State
Department intervention supporting the immunity of a Cuban freigh-
ter,5" the intervention may actually favour the foreigner - but it can
never fail to affect his rights. Accordingly, if such litigation merits an
impartial decision, it must be provided, as in the Lotus case, by an
international tribunal. If not, the state should frankly proceed by
executive or legislative fiat. If the decision should be based on national
policy, let it not be confused with international law, a confusion which
edifies neither the former nor the latter.
The third area to which international courts should have entry is
that of treaty interpretation. This includes disputes between two gov-
ernments or between two individuals affected by the treaty who are
nationals of different states party to it. Either type of dispute may
now be heard in national courts, although the former, in the United
States, is subject by the constitution to the original jurisdiction of the
federal Supreme Court,5 while the latter may arise in any federal"
and even state court. 3
There is nothing wrong with such national jurisdiction, but it
cannot be conclusive, for the rights of one party under a treaty cannot
be impartially determined, or seem to be impartially determined by
the courts of the other party. Both of the previously-discussed dis-
abilities of national courts apply here: the susceptibility of the court
to allegations of bias by reason of executive intervention or, simply, the
national affiliation of the judges. In the case of treaties, however, new
limitations on the efficacy of the national courts arise. The most im-
portant of these is sovereign immunity: the general immunity of the
federal government and the states of the Union (the latter being set
forth in the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) and the sover-
eign immunity which, in our courts, protects a foreign government
from suit both by persons and other governments. 4 This immunity is
so immutable that the representative of a foreign government need only
establish his credentials to deprive the national court of all further
jurisdiction.55 Only an international court escapes these consequences.
50. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). In this case
a Cuban ship was brought to United States waters by a defecting crew and was
claimed by, among others, its former owner. The court ordered both the ship and
its cargo of sugar (claimed by United Fruit Co.) returned to Cuba on the inter-
vention of the State Department. "We conclude," said the court, "that the
certificate and grant of immunity should be accepted by the court without further
inquiry" (at 26).
51. Art. III, s.2.
52. Ibid.
53. For a recent example: Banco do Brazil S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co.,
29 Misc. 2d 229 (1961).
54. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
55. Regina v. Madan, 2 W.L.R. 231, (Ct. Crim. App.) (1961).
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Finally, even if all these disabilities were overcome, it is still
highly doubtful that treaties, which are the "federal legislation of the
world," should be subject, in cases which affect the rights of the other
party, to purely national interpretation. Treaties attempt to weave a
fabric of uniformity in the practice and conduct of states. Lack of
uniformity in interpretation of treaties can totally frustrate that pur-
pose; and uniformity can only be assured where there is an international
court of final recourse to knot up the unravelled strands of national
jurisprudence.
Fortunately, there is rather widespread recognition of this and
the texts of treaties frequently make provisions for resolving clashes
of national interest arising out of its terms by reference to international
tribunals. One typical approach is to give compulsory jurisdiction to
the International Court of Justice, as in the Japanese Peace treaty :"
ARTICLE 22
If in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there
has arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of
the Treaty, which is not settled by reference to a special claims
tribunal or by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request
of any party thereto, be referred for decision to the International
Court of Justice. Japan and those Allied Powers which are not
already parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice
will deposit with the Registrar of the Court, at the time of their
respective ratifications of the present Treaty, and in conformity
with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, dated
October 15, 1946, a general declaration accepting the jurisdiction,
without special agreement, of the Court generally in respect to all
disputes of the character referred to in this Article.
A functional variation of this formula yields the provision that such
disputes, if not resolved by diplomatic means "shall be submitted to
arbitration or, upon agreement of the Parties, to the International
Court of Justice. '5 7 This has the effect of making some form of inter-
56. 136 U.N.T.S. 45 (1951). For an example of special acceptance of I.C.J. compul-
sory jurisdiction, this by Cambodia, see: 137 U.N.T.S. 13 (1952). See, further,
Wilson, Postwar Commercial Treaties of the United States, 43 Am. J. INT'L L. 262
(1949). Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42
MiNN. L. Rxv. 805 (1958).
57. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States
of America and the Federal Republic of Germany, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No.
3593; 273 U.N.T.S. 3. There are, currently, many variations on this theme all of
which provide for recourse to the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. should other
means of adjustment fail. See, for example: the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation with: Ireland (1 U.S.T. 785, art. 23) ; Japan (4 U.S.T. 2062, art.
24) ; Ethiopia (4 U.S.T. 2134, art. 17 - "Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations") ;
Greece (5 U.S.T. 1829, art. 26) ; Israel (5 U.S.T. 550, art. 24) ; Netherlands (8
U.S.T. 2043, art. 25).
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national adjudication compulsory, albeit not that of the International
Court.
The more institutional the consequences of a treaty are, the more
extensive must be the functions of judicial review. The Charter of the
United Nations provides that "The International Court of Justice shall
be the principal judicial organ of The United Nations""8 and empowers
the General Assembly and Security Council to request advisory opin-
ions of The Court on any legal matter. It allows "other organs of the
United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be
so authorized by the General Assembly" to "request advisory opinions
of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their
activities." 9 Moreover, before it proceeds to the resolution of a dis-
pute or situation,6" "The Security Council should also take into con-
sideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by
the parties to the International Court of Justice .. "61
Provisions of even greater moment are those setting ,forth the
role of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community,
which establishes a tribunal62 of seven judges.63 "Any Member State
which considers that another Member State has failed to fulfill any of
its obligations under this Treaty may refer the matter to the Court
of Justice"6 which, if the matter is not resolved within three months
by the Commission of the European Community, may then hear and
determine the issue.
The Court also has wide powers of review over the acts of the
Economic Community's Treaty Organization itself (except those of
the Council and the Commission) and its machinery for declaring such
acts ultra vires may be set in motion not only by states but also by
''any natural or legal person .. .against a decision addressed to him
or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or
decision addressed to another person, is of direct and specific concern
to him.''65
Perhaps most dramatic of all has been the enlargement of inter-
national judicial review under the terms of the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" of the Council
58. U.N. CHARTMR, art. 92.
59. Id., art. 96.
60. These terms are used by way of reference to Art. 33 of the Charter.
61. Id., art. 36. One instance of a dispute actually being referred by the Security
Council to the International Court is afforded by the Corfu Channel Case: United
Kingdom v. Albania, I.C.J. REP. 1949.
62. 298 U.N.T.S. 14 (1958), art. 164.
63. Id., art. 165.
64. Id., art. 170.
65. Id., art. 173. See: Buergenthal, snpra, n.l.
66. Supra n.1.
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of Europe, which, in addition to enumerating the civil rights to be
protected, proceeds to establish a Human Rights Court to try cases
alleging violation of the rights of individuals not only by other parties
to the treaty but also by the state of which the complainant is a citizen.
The jurisdiction of the court is not compulsory but may be made so
by acceptance of the supplementary declaration.67 Two cases, that of
Mr. Lawless of Ireland and M. de Becker of Belgium have been heard
by the court in its first year. Both suits were against the suitor's own
government, illustrating a new trend in international law to concern
itself with more than relations between the various governments, or
between persons of various nationalities. If the trend continues, the
relation of the citizen to his government or to other citizens of the
same state may well be subject to certain international standards -
the "law" against Genocide" comes most readily to mind - which
will perforce open new vistas for international courts.
67. Id., art. 46.
68. Resolution approving the Genocide Convention and setting out its text:
U.N. Doc. A/810, Rgs No. 260 (III), G.A.O.R., at 174.
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